This paper reviews the relationship between natural resources and economic growth, and stresses how natural capital tends to crowd out foreign capital, social capital, human capital, and physical capital, thereby impeding economic growth across countries and presumably also over time. Specifically, the paper presents empirical evidence that nations with abundant natural capital tend to have (a) less trade and foreign investment, (b) more corruption, (c) less education, and (d) less domestic investment than other nations that are less well endowed with, or less dependent on, natural resources. This matters for growth because empirical evidence also indicates that trade, honesty, education, and investment are all positively and significantly related to economic growth across countries.
This paper reviews some aspects of the experience of natural-resource-rich countries around the world since the 1960s. The paper begins by identifying four main channels through which natural resource abundance or intensity seem to have inhibited economic growth across countries. As we proceed, an attempt will be made to provide a glimpse of some of the empirical results that have emerged in the past few years from studies of the cross-country relationships between natural resource dependence and economic growth and various key determinants of growth across the world. Even if the evidence reviewed below is exclusively cross-sectional, it reflects a pattern that accords with a number of historical case studies of individual resource-rich countries. 1 This review is followed by a brief discussion of the disappointing economic growth record of the OPEC countries, and then by a brief discussion of the lessons that may be drawn from Norway's singularly successful management of its oil wealth.
I. Four Channels: Theory and Evidence
The structure of recent models of the relationship between natural resource abundance or intensity and economic growth is nearly always the same. An abundance of or heavy dependence on natural resources is taken to influence some variable or mechanism "X" which impedes growth. An important challenge for economic growth theorists and empirical workers in the field is to identify and map these intermediate variables and mechanisms.
To date, four main channels of transmission from natural resource abundance or intensity to slow economic growth have been suggested in the literature. 2 As we shall see, these channels can be described as crowding out: natural capital, it will be argued, tends to crowd out other types of capital and thereby inhibit economic growth.
Channel 1: The Dutch disease and foreign capital
An overvalued currency was the first symptom associated with the Dutch disease following the discovery of natural gas deposits within the jurisdiction of the Netherlands in the North Sea in the late 1950s and early 1960s, but subsequently several other symptoms came to light. Natural resource abundance is, as a rule, accompanied by booms and busts: the prices of raw materials fluctuate a great deal in world markets, and so do supplies. The resulting fluctuations in export earnings trigger exchange rate volatility, perhaps no less so under fixed exchange rates than under floating rates. Unstable exchange rates create uncertainty that can be harmful to exports and other trade, including foreign investment. Further, the Dutch disease can strike even in countries that do not have their own national currency. In this case, the natural-resource-based industry is able to pay higher wages and also higher interest rates than other export and import-competing industries, thus making it difficult for the latter to remain competitive at world market prices. This problem can become particularly acute in countries with centralized wage bargaining (or with oligopolistic banking systems, for that matter) where the natural-resource industries set the tone in nation-wide wage negotiations and dictate wage settlements that other industries can ill afford.
3
In one or all of these ways, the Dutch disease tends to reduce the level of total exports or bias the composition of exports away from those kinds of manufacturing and service exports that may be particularly good for growth over time. Exports of capital -i.e., inward foreign direct investment -may also suffer in the same way. The mechanism is essentially the same. In other words, natural capital tends to crowd out foreign capital, broadly speaking. Figure   1a shows that the Netherlands recovered quickly from the Dutch disease, having seen a persistent upward trend in their total merchandise exports relative to GDP since the mid-1960s. Meanwhile, Norway's total exports have been stagnant relative to GDP at a level well below that of the Netherlands, even if the Dutch economy is almost three times as large as that of Norway. Figure 1b tells a similar story about foreign direct investment, which has increased relative to GDP in both countries since 1975, but less rapidly in Norway than in the Netherlands. Figure 1c shows that the share of manufacturing exports in total exports in the Netherlands increased from 50 percent in 1980 to 70 percent in 1998, while the same ratio has hovered around 30 percent in Norway without showing any tendency to rise over time. These things matter because exports and foreign investment are good for growth (see, for example, Frankel and Romer, 1999) . Openness to trade and investment stimulates imports of goods and services, capital, technology, ideas, and know-how. Further, too much primary-export dependence and too little manufacturing may hurt economic growth over the long haul. The upshot is that the Dutch disease is a matter of concern mainly because of its potentially deleterious consequences for economic growth.
What is the empirical evidence? Figure 2a shows a scatterplot of natural resource abundance and openness to external trade around the world. Natural resource abundance or intensity, which is measured along the horizontal axis, is measured by the share of natural capital in national wealth in 1994 -i.e., the share of natural capital in total capital, which comprises physical, human, and natural capital (but not social capital; see World Bank, 1997) . The natural capital share used here is close to the source: it is intended to come closer to a direct measurement of the intensity of natural resources across countries than the various proxies that have been used in earlier studies, mainly the share of primary (i.e., nonmanufacturing) exports in total exports or in gross domestic product (GDP) and the share of the primary sector in employment or the labor force. 4 Openness on the vertical axis is defined as the difference between the actual average ratio of exports to GDP over the period under review, 1965-1998 , and the export ratio predicted by a linear regression of the average export ratio on the logarithm of the average population (in thousands) across countries to adjust for country size. This adjustment is made to reflect the fact that large countries are less dependent on foreign trade than smaller ones that need to extend their home markets beyond their national borders to make up for their small size. This indicator of openness is above zero for countries that are more open to trade than their size predicts, and below zero for countries that are less open to trade than their size predicts. The 91 countries in the sample are represented by one observation each for each variable under study.
The regression line through the scatterplot in Figure 2a suggests that an increase of ten percentage points in the natural capital share from one country to another is associated with a decrease in the openness indicator by about four percent of GDP on average. The relationship is economically as well as statistically significant (Spearman's rank correlation is -0.33). 5 Given existing evidence that foreign trade is good for growth, Figure 2a suggests that natural resource abundance may hurt growth by harming trade.
It needs to be understood that no conclusions are being drawn here as to cause and effect. Figure 2a is only intended to display the data in a way that accords with the results of multivariate regression analyses that can help account for more potential determinants of exports (Gylfason, 1999) , and where the attempt was made to distinguish cause from effect. The same disclaimer applies to all the figures that follow. Even so, the study of bivariate cross-sectional relationships has many shortcomings. For one thing, such studies bypass the diversity of individual country experiences. For another, they do not account for economic developments over time, as panel studies are designed to do. 
Channel 2: Rent seeking and social capital
In second place, huge natural resource rents, especially in conjunction with ill-defined property rights, imperfect or missing markets, and lax legal structures in many developing countries and emerging market economies, may lead to rampant rent-seeking behavior on the part of producers, thus diverting resources away from more socially fruitful economic activity (Auty, 2001; Gelb, 1988) . The combination of abundant natural resources, missing markets, and lax legal structures may have quite destructive consequences. In extreme cases, civil wars break out -such as Africa's diamond wars -which not only divert factors of production from socially productive uses but also destroy societal institutions and the rule of law. In other, less extreme cases, the struggle for huge resource rents may lead to a concentration of economic and political power in the hands of elites that, once in power, use the rent to placate their political supporters and thus secure their hold on power, with stunted or weakened democracy and slow growth as a result (Karl, 1997) . Moreover, an abundance of natural resources may tempt foreign governments to invade with destructive consequences and the possibility of such an event may prompt the domestic authorities to spend vast resources on national defense. Large military expenditures tend to inhibit growth through their adverse effects on capital formation and resource allocation (Knight, Loayza, and Villaneuva, 1996) .
Rent seeking can also take other, more subtle forms. For example, governments may be tempted to thwart markets by granting favored enterprises or individuals privileged access to common-property natural resources, as, for example, in Russia, or they may offer tariff protection or other favors to producers at public expense, creating competition for such favors among the rent seekers. Extensive rent seekingi.e., seeking to make money from market distortions -can breed corruption in business and government, thus distorting the allocation of resources and reducing both economic efficiency and social equity. Empirical evidence and economic theory suggest that import protection (which is often extended to foreign capital as well as goods and services), cronyism, and corruption all tend to impede economic efficiency and growth (Bardhan, 1997; Mauro, 1995) .
Furthermore, abundant natural resources may imbue people with a false sense of security and lead governments to lose sight of the need for good and growth-friendly economic management, including free trade, bureaucratic efficiency, and institutional quality . Put differently, abundant natural capital may crowd out social capital, by which is meant the infrastructure and institutions of a society in a broad sense: its culture, cohesion, law, system of justice, rules and customs and so on, including trust (Woolcock, 1998; Paldam and Svendsen, 2000) . Incentives to create wealth through good policies and institutions may wane because of the relatively effortless ability to extract wealth from the soil or the sea. Manna from heaven can be a mixed blessing. The argument can be extended to unconditional foreign aid. There are indications that natural-resource-rich countries are more dependent than others on foreign aid, which may actually exacerbate their economic predicament. Now consider corruption, to take but one aspect of social capital corrosion into account. Insofar as natural resource abundance involves public allocation of access to scarce common-property resources to private parties without payment, thereby essentially leaving the resource rent up for grabs, it is only to be expected that resource-rich countries may be more susceptible to corruption than others. What do the data say?
In Figure 3a , which covers 60 countries, the share of natural capital in national wealth is plotted along the horizontal axis as before and the corruption perceptions Similar results obtain when natural resource abundance or intensity is instead measured by the share of the primary sector in the labor force, 1965-1990 ( Figure 3b ).
Now we have data for many more countries, or 88 rather than 60. The correlation is again quite significant; the Spearman rank correlation is -0.67. Figure 3c shows the cross-sectional relationship between corruption and economic growth. The figure suggests that an increase in the corruption perceptions index (i.e., a decrease in corruption) by one point from one place to another goes along with an increase per capita growth by almost one percentage point per year on the average, for given initial income. 8 This is not a small effect -if it is an effect, that is, as opposed to a mere correlation. 9 The pattern is quite significant; the rank correlation is 0.78. The number of countries is 64.
Taking Figures 3b and 3c together, we see that an increase in the primary labor share by 16 percentage points goes hand in hand with a decrease in the corruption perceptions index by one point (Figure 3b ), which in turn goes along with a decrease in per capita growth by one percentage point per year on the average, for given initial income ( Figure 3c ). Here we have another possible reason why natural resource abundance or intensity appears to inhibit economic growth across countries.
Channel 3: Education and human capital
Third, natural resource abundance or intensity may reduce private and public incentives to accumulate human capital due to a high level of non-wage income -e.g., dividends, social spending, low taxes. Awash in cash, natural-resource-rich nations may be tempted to underestimate the long-run value of education. Of course, the rent stream from abundant natural resources may enable nations to give a high priority to education -as in Botswana, for instance, where government expenditure on education relative to national income is among the highest in the world. Even so, empirical evidence shows that, across countries, school enrolment at all levels is inversely related to natural resource abundance or intensity, as measured by the share of the labor force engaged in primary production (Gylfason, Herbertsson, and Zoega, 1999) .
There is also evidence that, across countries, public expenditures on education relative to national income, expected years of schooling, and school enrolment are all inversely related to natural resource abundance (Gylfason, 2001 ; see also Temple, 1999) . Once again, abundant natural capital appears to crowd out human capital. This matters because more and better education is good for growth.
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As far as economic growth is concerned, however, the supply of education may matter less than demand (Birdsall, 1996) . This is relevant here because public 8 Notice that the growth measures are slightly different in Figures 2b and 3c . The reason is that the adjustment for initial income in the two figures is based on different measures of natural resource abundance, the natural capital share in Figure 2b and the primary labor share in Figure 3c . This difference has no material effect on the patterns displayed in the figures. 9 For comparison, Mauro (1995) presents econometric evidence that suggests that a decrease in the corruption index by one point (i.e., increased corruption) from one country to the next is associated with a reduction in per capita growth of one-quarter a percentage point per year on the average. 10 For a survey of education and growth in OECD countries, see Temple (2000) .
expenditure on education tends to be supply-led and of mediocre quality, and may thus fail to foster efficiency, equality and growth, in contrast to private expenditure on education, which is generally demand-determined and thus, perhaps, likely to be of a higher quality and more conducive to growth. For this reason, I prefer to use school enrolment rates rather than public expenditures on education as a measure of education in the empirical analysis to follow. decreasing returns to education, and it is, moreover, statistically significant (the rank correlation is 0.62). The number of observations is 87. It needs to be emphasized that school enrolment reflects, at best, the quantity of education provided rather than the quality of education received. Public expenditure on education is also positively correlated with economic growth across countries in our sample (not shown), but the correlation is not significant in a statistical sense.
Taking Figures 4a and 4b together, we see that, across countries, secondary-school enrolment is inversely related to natural resource abundance and directly related to economic growth. Specifically, an increase in the natural capital share by 25
percentage points goes along with a decrease in secondary-school enrolment by 45
percentage points according to Figure 4a , which, in turn, goes along with a decrease in economic growth by almost two percentage points by Figure 5b . Therefore, natural resource abundance seems capable of reducing economic growth significantly, not only through the Dutch disease, rent seeking, and overconfidence that tends to reduce the quality of economic policy and structure, but also by weakening public and private incentives to accumulate human capital. If so, the adverse effects of natural resource abundance on economic growth since the 1960s that have been reported in the literature may in part reflect the effect of education on growth.
How can we interpret these results? Natural-resource-based industries as a rule are less high-skill labor intensive and perhaps also less high-quality capital intensive than other industries, and thus confer relatively few external benefits on other industries (Wood, 1999) . Moreover, workers released from primary industries, such as agriculture, fisheries, forestry, or mining, generally have relatively limited general, labor-market relevant education to offer new employers in other industries. There are exceptions, though, such as in modern agriculture and, indeed, in high-tech oildrilling operations. But insofar as high-skill labor and high-quality capital are less common in primary production than elsewhere, this may help explain why natural resource abundance and the associated preponderance of primary production and primary exports tend to impede learning by doing, technological advance, and economic growth. This linkage reinforces the case for investment in education and training as an engine of growth: more and better education tends to shift comparative advantage away from primary production towards manufacturing and services, and thus to accelerate learning by doing and growth.
Channel 4: Saving, investment, and physical capital
Fourth, natural resource abundance may blunt private and public incentives to save and invest and thereby impede economic growth. Specifically, when the share of output that accrues to the owners of natural resources rises, the demand for capital falls, and this leads to lower real interest rates and less rapid growth (Gylfason and Zoega, 2001 ). Moreover, if mature institutions are conducive to an efficient use of resources, including natural resources, and if poorly developed institutions are not, then natural resource abundance may also retard the development of financial institutions in particular and hence discourage saving, investment, and economic growth through that channel as well. As in the case of education, it is not solely the volume of investment that counts because quality -i.e., efficiency -is also of great importance. Unproductive investments -white elephants! -may seem unproblematic to governments or individuals who are flush with cash thanks to nature's bounty. 
Natural capital and economic growth
To conclude the story, Figure 6a shows a scatterplot of economic growth per capita from 1965 to 1998 and natural resource abundance as measured in Figures 2a, 3a, 4a , and 5a. The figure covers 85 countries. The growth rate has been adjusted for initial income as before. The regression line through the scatterplot in Figure 6a suggests 11 There is also evidence that natural capital may crowd out financial capital. See Gylfason and Zoega (2001) .
that an increase of about ten percentage points in the natural capital share from one country to another is associated with a decrease in per capita growth by one percentage point per year on average. 12 The relationship is also significant in a statistical sense (Spearman's rank correlation is -0.64), and conforms to the partial correlations that have been reported in multiple regression analyses where other relevant determinants of growth (investment, education, etc., as well as initial income to account for catch-up and convergence) are taken into account. A relationship of this kind has been reported in a number of recent studies Warner, 1995, 1999; Gylfason and Herbertsson, forthcoming; Gylfason, Herbertsson, and Zoega, 1999) .
At last, Figure 6b shows that a similar inverse relationship between natural resources and economic growth emerges when natural resource abundance or intensity is measured by the share of the primary sector in total employment as in 
II. The Experience of the OPEC Countries and Norway
In most countries that are rich in oil, minerals, and other natural resources, economic growth over the long haul tends to be slower than in other countries that are less well endowed. For example, in Nigeria, with all its oil wealth, gross national product (GNP) per capita today is no higher than it was at independence in 1960. And Nigeria is not alone. From 1965 to 1998, the rate of growth of GNP per capita in Iran and
Venezuela was on average -1 percent per year, -2 percent in Libya, -3 percent in Iraq 12 There is admittedly an element of statistical bias in Figure 4 in that increased education and investment increase human and physical capital, thereby reducing the share of natural capital in national wealth and increasing economic growth. This bias, however, is probably not serious because Figure 6a can be reproduced by using different measures of natural resource abundance, such as the share of the primary sector in the labor force or the share of primary exports in total exports or GDP. See Figure 6b. and Kuwait, and -6 percent in Qatar (1970 Qatar ( -1995 , to mention six other OPEC countries (World Bank, 2000 (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) would hardly have been surprised, for he described the situation as follows (quoted from a newspaper interview with his oil minister, Shaikh Yamani):
In one generation we went from riding camels to riding Cadillacs. The way we are wasting money, I fear the next generation will be riding camels again. But let us not jump to conclusions. The problem is not the existence of natural wealth as such, but rather the failure to avert the dangers that accompany the gifts of nature. It is not inevitable that abundant natural resources prevent the emergence of a dynamic economy or that the discovery of such resources acts to dampen an already developed economy. Natural resources can be a blessing as well as a curse. Norway, indeed, is a case in point. The world's second largest oil exporter (after Saudi-Arabia),
Norway shows as yet no clear symptoms of the Dutch disease -other, perhaps, than a stagnant ratio of exports to GDP, albeit at a rather high level, or about 40 percent of GDP, since before the oil discoveries, indicating that Norway's oil exports have crowded out non-oil exports krone for krone relative to income (recall Figure 1a) .
Moreover, as we saw in Figure 1b , Norway has attracted a relatively limited, yet gradually increasing inflow of gross foreign direct investment, equivalent to 8 percent of GDP in 1998 (adjusted for purchasing power parity; see World Bank, 2000) , far below the figures for Sweden and Finland next door (23 percent and 36 percent). Nor does Norway show any signs yet of socially damaging rent-seeking behavior even if increasingly loud calls are being voiced for using more of the oil revenue to address domestic social needs rather than continue to build up the government-owned oil fund, which is invested in foreign securities. There are no signs either of a false sense of security or of an inadequate commitment to education, on the contrary. Growth has thus far remained stubbornly high. Even so, some observers of the Norwegian scene have recently expressed concerns that some deep-seated structural problems in the country's education and health care sectors (government monopoly, insufficient competition, low efficiency, etc.) may be misdiagnosed as financial problems because the money available from the oil fund may blunt the willingness of politicians to undertake difficult structural reforms.
One of the factors that separates Norway's experience from that of OPEC is timing. Norway was already a developed country at the time of the oil discoveries in the 1970s. Most importantly, Norway's social institutions were mature and the financial system relatively developed, although by no means fully liberalized. All of this facilitated judicious and far-sighted management of Norway's oil wealth, at least compared with most other oil producers (Hannesson, 2001) . In contrast, full-fledged capitalist development did not take place in most OPEC countries prior to the discovery of their oil resources, or since for that matter (Karl, 1997) . While Norway has built up substantial assets abroad, Saudi-Arabia has accumulated debts.
Norway has charted a long-run-oriented, tax-based, and reasonably marketfriendly approach to the management of its vast oil resources. Exactly how vast they are depends on oil prices, which are quite volatile: estimates of the oil wealth range from 50 percent to 250 percent of GNP (Thøgersen, 1994) . According to Section 1-1 of the Petroleum Act of 1996, the title to petroleum deposits on the Norwegian continental shelf is vested in the State. This means that, in principle, all the rent from oil and gas should accrue to the Norwegian people through their government. The
State's title to these resources constitutes the legal basis for government regulation of the petroleum sector as well as for its taxation in accordance with the Petroleum Taxation Act of 1975.
Exploration and production licenses are awarded for a small fee to domestic and foreign oil companies alike. Why small? Because the Norwegian government has decided to expropriate the oil and gas rent through taxes and fees as well as direct involvement in the development of the resources rather than through sales or auctioning of exploration and production rights (OECD, 1999) . The State has a direct interest in most offshore oil and gas fields and, like other licensees, receives a corresponding proportion of production and other revenues, roughly 40 percent of the total. Through its direct partnership with other licensees as well as through various taxes and fees, it is estimated that the Norwegian State has managed to absorb about 80 percent of the resource rent since 1980. 13 Thus, in 1997, revenues from petroleum activities accounted for more than a fifth of total government revenues and were equivalent to 9-10 percent of Norway's mainland GNP, or 8-9 percent of total GNP, including oil. In 2000, the oil sector's contribution rose to more than 25 percent of GNP, but it is envisaged to drop to 5 percent by 2020. The oil revenue is deposited in the Norwegian Petroleum Fund, which is being built up and invested mostly in foreign securities for the benefit of the current generation of Norwegians when they reach old age as well as for future generations, and also in order to shield the domestic economy from overheating and possible waste -a shrewd strategy, efficient and fair. 
III. Concluding Remarks
Natural resources bring risks. One is that too many people become locked in low-skill intensive natural-resource-based industries, including agriculture, and thus fail through no fault of their own to advance their own or their children's education and earning power. Another risk is that the authorities and other inhabitants of resourcerich countries become overconfident and therefore tend to underrate or overlook the need for good economic policies and institutions as well as for good education and good investments. In other words, nations that believe that natural capital is their most important asset may develop a false sense of security and become negligent about the accumulation of foreign, social, human, and physical capital. Indeed, resource-rich nations can live well of their natural resources over extended periods, even with poor economic policies and institutions and a weak commitment to education. Awash in easy cash, they may find that difficult reforms do not pay. Nations without natural resources have a smaller margin for error, and are less likely to make this mistake. In resource-rich countries, awareness of these risks, as well as a conscious effort and ability to contain them, is perhaps the best insurance policy against them. 1 9 6 0 1 9 6 3 1 9 6 6 1 9 6 9 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 7 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 6 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 7 
